Some factors affecting independence movements: An overview
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.2.2.101Abstract
The article outlines a game-theoretic framework that can be used to analyze the nature and outcomes of independence movements in disputed or occupied regions. It is seen that the nature of an independence movement depends on a complex interplay among personal characteristics of movement leaders, personal characteristics of the occupier, the proclivity of the citizens to participate in the movement, and the cost structure of the occupier. To a large extent, the results described in this article depend on whether the strategies of the conflicting parties are complements or substitutes.References
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