Intra-organizational conflict: Origin and cost
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15355/epsj.6.1.12Keywords:
Metropolitan Water District of Southern CaliforniaAbstract
This article explores the origin and cost of conflict within the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MET), a cooperative of 26 member agencies delivering water to nearly 20 million people. Conflict within MET has existed for over 30 years, but increasing population and decreasing water supplies mean that this conflict is becoming more costly in terms of direct conflict, policies that misallocate water, and expenditure on unnecessary infrastructure. Although conflict exists within most businesses and bureaucracies, it is often difficult to identify the positions and actions of parties to the conflict and to observe the effects of conflict. This case study is useful for its clear illustration of how diverging objectives among participants (autonomous member agencies) result in conflict and the different costs that result from conflict.References
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